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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
: Case No. 20000813-CA 
vs. 
JON DONALD HAMLING Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant appeals from a sentence for attempted possession of a controlled 
substance, a class A misdemeanor, in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. 
§ 58-37-8(2)(a)(i) (1998) and UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-4-101 (1999), in the Third 
Judicial District, Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, presiding. 
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) 
(1996). 
ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Did the trial court clearly err when it found that defendant, who had notice 
of his sentencing hearing and was free to attend, was voluntarily absent? 
Sentencing decisions are reviewed for abuse of discretion. See State v. 
Rhodes, 818 P.2d 1048, 1049 (Utah App. 1991). Review of factual findings is for 
clear error. See id. Whether a defendant has voluntarily absented himself is a 
question of fact reviewed for clear error. See Johnson v. State, 604 S.W.2d 927, 
929 (Ark. 1980) (finding of voluntary absence not "clearly wrong"); Frost v. United 
States, 618 A.2d 653, 657 (D.C. 1992) (finding of voluntary absence not "clearly 
erroneous"); cf State v. Reed, 992 P.2d 1132, 1133 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1999) (review of 
voluntary absence determination for abuse of discretion"). 
2. Should this Court adopt the novel rule, not asserted below, that a trial 
court may not sentence a voluntarily absent defendant unless he was previously 
warned that sentencing could proceed in his absence? 
This is a question of law, and review is for correctness. Rhodes, 818 P.2d at 
1049. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
Resolution of this case involves interpretation of the following provisions: 
Utah R. Crim. P. 17(a)(2). 
(a) In all cases the defendant shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel. The defendant shall be personally 
present at the trial with the following exceptions: 
(2) In prosecutions for offenses not punishable by death, the 
defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of 
the time for trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a 
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verdict or judgment entered therein shall have the same effect as if 
defendant had been present; . . . 
Utah R. Crim. P. 22(a)&(b). 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no 
contest, the court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be 
not less than two nor more than 45 days after the verdict or plea, unless 
the court, with the concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. 
Pending sentence, the court may commit the defendant or may continue 
or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an 
opportunity to make a statement and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence 
should not be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an 
opportunity to present any information material to the imposition of 
sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in 
defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in 
defendant's absence. If a defendant fails to appear for sentence, a 
warrant for defendant's arrest may be issued by the court. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with unlawful possession of a controlled substance 
(methamphetamine), a third degree felony, and with unlawful possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana), a class B misdemeanor, both in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2), and booked into jail. R. 3, 11. Defendant pleaded guilty 
to attempted possession of methamphetamine, a class A misdemeanor, on June 15, 
2000; and the court dismissed the marijuana count. R. 20-29. The court accepted 
the plea, notified defendant of his August 4 sentencing date, and released him to 
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Pre-Trial Services. R. 26-30, 63:2-3. Defendant was released from custody on June 
16,2000. PSIat4. 
Defendant reported to Adult Probation and Parole (AP&P) for preparation of 
his presentence investigation report (PSI). The report detailed an extensive history 
of criminal activity associated with substance abuse and various other offenses, 
including bail jumping. R. 62:4-6. It described a former probation terminated as 
unsuccessful following an initial revocation, reinstatement, and subsequent failure to 
report. R. 62:7. AP&P did not recommend probation. R. 62:13 
Defendant did not appear for sentencing. R. 64:2-3. The court noted that it 
had not had heard from defendant. R. 64:3-4. Defense counsel also had not heard 
from defendant for at least two weeks. R. 64:4. The court found that defendant had 
voluntarily absented himself, sentenced him in absentia to the statutory one-year 
indeterminate term, and issued a bench warrant for his arrest. R. 33-39, 64:4. 
Defense counsel then filed a motion to correct an illegal sentence, concluding 
with the following paradoxical prayer for relief: "Mr. Hamling requests that the 
court correct [its] sentence and issue a bench warrant for his arrest allowing him to 
address the court prior to being sentenced." R. 42. Although defendant still had not 
appeared, defense counsel also requested a hearing on the matter. Id. The court 
denied the motion without a hearing, reasoning "that without the defendant's 
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personal appearance, such hearing [was] neither necessary nor warranted." R. 44, 
46-47. 
On August 31 defense counsel timely appealed defendant's conviction and the 
court's denial of his motion to correct an illegal sentence. R. 62. According to the 
district court docket, defendant was subsequently apprehended and booked on 
October 11, 2000, more than two months after sentencing. Docket, Third District 
Court-Salt Lake, Case No. 001909844, at 5 (attached in Addendum).1 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
According to the probable cause statement, a Salt Lake County sheriffs 
detective observed what appeared to be a drug sale in a parking lot located at 4100 
South Redwood Road. R. 4. The detective followed defendant, one of the 
participants, when he left the area in a Ford Bronco. Id. 
The detective then observed defendant, the driver and sole occupant of the 
Bronco, stop his vehicle in a church parking lot, exit, remove his shirt, and place his 
shirt inside the car. The detective contacted defendant and identified himself. 
While speaking with defendant, the detective observed a plastic bag containing a tan 
crystal substance lying on the car seat. Id. 
!The State requests that this Court take judicial notice of the trial court docket in 
this case as permitted by Rule 201 of the Utah Rules of Evidence. See Richie v. Richie, 
784 P.2d 465, 468 (Ut. App. 1989) (court "may take judicial notice of the records and 
prior proceedings in the same case"); Mel Trimble Real Estate v. Monte Vista Ranch, Inc., 
758 P.2d 451, 456 & n.4 (Ut. App. 1988) (court may take judicial notice on appeal). 
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The detective arrested defendant and retrieved the plastic bag, which field-
tested positive for methamphetamine. Id. The detective then searched the car and 
located a container with a substance that appeared to be marijuana. Id. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. The trial court did not clearly err when it found that defendant's absence 
was voluntary. Defendant had notice of the sentencing hearing and was free to 
attend, in the sense that he was not incarcerated, but did not. Other evidence in the 
record—both evidence before the court at the time of its ruling and evidence 
developed subsequent to the ruling—supports this finding. Defendant did not, either 
at sentencing or at any time after sentencing, proffer a reason for his absence. 
2. Defendant did not raise the warning issue below and has not argued any 
exception to the preservation requirement on appeal; this claim is therefore not 
subject to review. In any event, the trial court has no affirmative duty to warn 
defendants that they may be sentenced in absentia, and Utah law does not preclude 
sentencing a voluntarily absent defendant in the absence of a warning. A defendant 
who has notice and is free to attend waives his right to presence by his voluntary 
absence. 
ARGUMENT 
Defendant claims that the trial court violated Rule 22 of the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure; Article I, Section 12, of the Utah Constitution; the Sixth 
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Amendment; and due process by sentencing him in absentia. Br. Aplt. at 6. He 
claims that "the record fails to demonstrate a knowing and voluntary waiver of the 
right to presence." Br. Aplt. at 14. He further argues that a knowing and voluntary 
waiver is impossible unless a trial court has warned a defendant that he can be 
sentenced in his absence. Br. Aplt. at 7. 
Point I 
The trial court did not clearly err when it found 
that defendant's absence from sentencing was voluntary. 
Defendant states that the record does not establish a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of his right to be present and defend at sentencing. Br. Aplt. at 14. In 
support of that claim, defendant appears to argue that the record does not 
demonstrate that he was voluntarily absent. See id. Defendant's argument on this 
point is a challenge to the court's finding of fact, and appellate review is for clear 
error.2 See Johnson v. State, 604 S.W.2d at 929; Frost v. United States, 618 A.2d 
653, 657 (D.C. 1992). 
2Defendant argues that whether he was or was not voluntarily absent should be 
reviewed for correctness and cites in support State v. Ham, 910 P.2d 433, 438 (Utah App. 
1996). Ham applies the correctness standard to the ultimate issue of whether consent to 
search has been voluntarily given. Whether consent has been voluntarily given is not a 
mere question of fact, i.e., of whether a defendant agreed to a search, but requires that the 
court consider whether the defendant's agreement was sufficiently uncoerced to be 
treated as legally voluntary. When reviewing the voluntariness of a consent to search, the 
appellate court must balance "the legitimate need for such searches and the equally 
important requirement of assuring an absence of coercion." Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 
412 U.S. 218, 227 (1973). Voluntariness in the context of a defendant's absenting 
himself from trial, on the other hand, requires no review for coercion and no balancing of 
competing interests. It is, rather, a mere factual inquiry. 
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The controlling case in this jurisdiction is State v. Anderson, 929 P.2d 1107 
(Utah 1996). In Anderson, the Utah Supreme Court held that a defendant is 
voluntarily absent when he is "free to attend" in the sense that he is "not 
incarcerated elsewhere." Id, at 1110. Likewise, he must have notice of the 
proceeding. Id. 
The record in this case indicates that defendant had notice and was not 
incarcerated. Defendant and his counsel both received notice of the sentencing date 
and time at the plea hearing. R. 28:29, 63:3. As indicated in the PSI prepared three 
days before trial, defendant had been released from custody on June 16, 2000. PSI 
at 4. The trial court's finding that defendant was voluntarily absent is therefore not 
clearly erroneous. 
While notice and freedom from incarceration are sufficient to support the trial 
court's finding of voluntariness, the finding is further supported by other evidence 
before the trial court. Defendant had not contacted the court, nor had he contacted 
his attorney regarding his absence. R. 64:3-4. Indeed, he had not contacted his 
attorney during the two-week period prior to sentencing. Id. Further, while 
defendant had appeared at AP&P for preparation of his PSI, the recommendation in 
the PSI was unfavorable in that it recommended jail time, a possible explanation for 
his failure to appear. PSI at 13. These factors all suggest a voluntary absence. 
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Furthermore, in determining whether a defendant is voluntarily absent, this 
Court has implicitly held that its review of a trial court's voluntariness decision may 
extend to evidence developed subsequent to the trial court's ruling. See State v. 
Wagstaff, 772 P.2d 987, 988 (Ut. App. 1989) (reviewing affidavit filed with motion 
for a new trial eight months after trial in absentia). This approach is also consistent 
with the express holdings of other jurisdictions. Reasoning that the validity of a 
trial court's voluntariness decision will be clearer in hindsight, these jurisdictions 
hold that appellate courts may consider evidence not before the trial court. See, e.g., 
Moore, 670 S.W.2d 259, 261 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984) (en banc). To exclude post-
ruling evidence would make it difficult for a defendant to show involuntary absence 
when moving to correct an illegal sentence. See id. Likewise, to preclude such 
evidence would hinder an appellate court's ability to accurately review the trial 
court's finding of voluntariness. See id. 
In the instant case, post-sentencing entries in the district court docket 
demonstrate that defendant made no effort to contact the court to explain his 
absence. See Docket, Third District Court-Salt Lake, Case No. 001909844, at 5. 
The docket shows only that defendant was finally apprehended and arrested on the 
court's bench warrant over two months after sentencing. Id. Further, had defense 
counsel discovered an explanation for defendant's absence, she could have 
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requested the opportunity to present such evidence in her motion to correct an 
illegal sentence. She did not. See R. 41-42. 
Finally, Anderson implicitly holds that a defendant who has notice and is not 
incarcerated carries the burden of proffering some "sound reason" to support a 
contention that his absence was not voluntary. 929 P.2d at 1100; see also Wagstaff, 
772 P.2d at 990) ("If [defendant's] absence is deliberate without a sound reason, the 
trial court may start in his absence."). Anderson's implicit holding is consistent 
with precedent in other jurisdictions expressly holding that a defendant, having 
notice of his trial or sentencing proceeding and not incarcerated, has the burden of 
at least proffering some evidence that his absence was involuntary. See United 
States v. Marotta, 518 F.2d 681, 684 (9th Cir. 1975) (stating that where defendant 
knew trial date and where no evidence suggested an enforced absence, defendant 
"ha[d] the burden of going forward and offering evidence to refute the 
[voluntariness] finding of the trial court"); State v. Worthy, 583 N.W.2d 270 (Minn. 
1998) (holding that a "defendant bears the burden of showing that his or her 
absence from trial was voluntary"); State v. Cotton, 621 S.W.2d 296, 298 (Mo. Ct. 
App. 1981) ("When a defendant is free on bond and does not appear at the time 
specified, it is presumed, until established otherwise, that his absence is voluntary 
for the purpose of deciding whether he has waived his right to be present at trial."); 
Moore v. State, 670 S.W.2d at 261 ("Absent any evidence from defendant to refute 
10 
the trial court's determination that his absence was voluntary, we will not disturb 
the trial court's finding."). 
In the instant case, defendant had notice and had been released from custody. 
He did not, however, proffer any reason for his absence from sentencing. He did 
not meet the burden of going forward to present some "sound reason" for his 
absence.3 
In sum, the trial court did not clearly err in finding defendant voluntarily 
absent. The record demonstrates both that defendant had notice of sentencing and 
that he was free to attend in the sense that he was not incarcerated. Other evidence 
in the record at the time of sentencing, as well as evidence developed subsequently, 
supports the trial court's finding. Finally, defendant did not, either at sentencing or 
at any time thereafter, proffer a reason for his absence. Nothing in the record 
suggests that defendant's absence was involuntary. 
3Pointing to statements made by defendant's sister in the PSI, defense counsel 
suggests that defendant had emotional, mental health, and cognitive challenges that might 
have interfered with his ability to keep appointments. Br. Aplt. at 4. Nothing in the 
record suggests, however, that he missed his sentencing hearing because he was confused 
about its date or time. Further, defendant timely appeared for his plea hearing and, 
apparently, also for the appointment(s) with AP&P necessary for the preparation of his 
PSI. See R. 28-29; 63; PSI at 8-11. Only after AP&P recommended jail time did 
defendant fail to keep appointments. 
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Point II 
A trial court may sentence a voluntarily absent defendant even though 
he has not been warned that sentencing may proceed in his absence. 
Defendant argues that sentencing cannot proceed, even though a defendant 
may be voluntarily absent, unless he has been warned that he can be sentenced in 
absentia. See Br. Aplt. at 14. Defendant asserts that a knowing and voluntary 
waiver of the right to presence is not possible without a warning. See id. 
Defendant did not make this claim below, either at the sentencing hearing or 
in his motion to correct an illegal sentence. See R. 41-42, 64:2-3. Defendant 
merely claimed that sentencing should not proceed in his absence (1) because he 
was entitled to make a statement and (2) because the court did not know the reason 
for his absence. See id. Defendant's claim that a warning must precede sentencing 
in absentia was not raised with sufficient specificity to bring that error "to the trial 
court's attention to give the court an opportunity to correct the error[] if 
appropriate." State v. Brown, 856 P.2d 358, 361 (Ut. App. 1993); see also State v. 
Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141, 1144-45 (Utah 1989); State v. Elm, 808 P.2d 1097, 1099 
(Ut. App. 1991). Defendant therefore failed to preserve this claim. 
As defendant does not argue plain error in his opening brief or assert any 
other exception to the preservation requirement, his claim is not subject to review. 
See State v. Pledger, 896 P.2d 1226, 1229 n.5 (Utah 1995); State v. Johnson, 114 
P.2dat 1144-45. 
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In any event, defendant's argument is not supported by Utah law or by sound 
policy considerations. Should this court accept defendant's argument it would, in 
effect, impose an affirmative duty on trial courts accepting guilty pleas or entering 
guilty verdicts to warn all unincarcerated defendants of the possibility of sentencing 
in absentia. Failure to give the warning would preclude imposition of sentence 
whenever defendants chose not to appear. 
Anderson details the Utah law controlling waiver of the right to presence. 
Under Anderson, voluntary absence—absence after notice where the defendant is 
free to attend in the sense that he is not incarcerated elsewhere—effects a waiver. 
"[A] defendant not accused of a capital crime waives his right to be present at 
sentencing by voluntary absence." Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. No warning is 
required.4 
4Defendant attempts to distinguish Anderson, arguing that no warning was required 
because of its unique procedural posture. The court, however, never entertained the 
possibility that a warning might be required. Rather, the Anderson court explained how, 
under the unique circumstances surrounding the case, sentencing was permissible without 
actual notice to defendant. 
The propriety of sentencing in absentia arose in the trial court after Anderson 
moved for permission to leave the state to visit his parents. The court granted his motion 
upon Anderson's written and oral agreement to be tried in absentia should he fail to 
appear for trial. Anderson failed to appear and was tried and sentenced in his absence. 
On appeal Anderson admitted waiving his right to be present a trial, but objected 
to his sentencing in absentia. He argued that the sentencing procedure violated his rights 
to due process and to allocution. On review, the Utah Supreme Court held that he had 
voluntarily absented himself and waived his right to be present at sentencing. After 
explaining that a defendant must generally have notice and be free from custody, the court 
held that Anderson, who did not have notice of the sentencing proceeding, had 
nevertheless waived his right to presence by his voluntary absence. The court found that 
13 
The Anderson holding relied on and is consistent with the Utah Rules of 
Criminal Procedure. Rule 22(b) states: "On the same grounds that a defendant may 
be tried in defendant's absence, defendant may likewise be sentenced in defendant's 
absence." Rule 17(a)(2) details those grounds: in non-capital cases, "the 
defendant's voluntary absence from the trial after notice to defendant of the time for 
trial shall not prevent the case from being tried and a verdict or judgment entered 
therein shall have the same effect as if defendant had been present." 
Neither Anderson nor the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure make waiver 
contingent on defendant's having been warned that he may be tried in his absence. 
Further, public policy considerations militate against requiring a warning. 
Anderson explains some of the practical considerations that favor sentencing 
in absentia. These include the possibility that "a defendant might. . . absent himself 
for years," during which a judge might go on to other assignments or retire, trial 
records could be lost or destroyed, victims might move, or trial counsel could die. 
See Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1111. At the very least, "it would be a waste of judicial 
resources to repeat a sentencing hearing simply due to [a] defendant's caprice." Id. 
The result defendant seeks, i.e., a ruling that sentencing cannot proceed for 
lack of warning, could force the trial courts to deal with every one of the practical 
Anderson's lack of notice was attributable to his own misconduct. "Had he maintained 
contact with pretrial services and with his attorney, as was his duty, he would have known 
of the sentencing date." 929 P.2d at 1111. 
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problems that Anderson sets forth. Should a court inadvertently fail to give a 
required warning, a defendant could simply choose not to attend—for whatever 
reason—and thereby foreclose, at least until his apprehension, further proceedings in 
the court. 
Defendant argues for a warning requirement relying on United States v. 
McPherson, 421 F.2d 1127, 1129 (D.C. Cir. 1969),5 a case effectively overruled by 
Taylor v. United States (Taylor II), 414 U.S. 17 (1973). McPherson, who was 
released on bail during trial and failed to return, was tried in absentia. On appeal, 
the appellate court reversed, holding that McPherson may not have intentionally 
relinquished his right to be present, testify, and confront the witnesses against him. 
Because he had not been warned that trial could continue without him, the court 
vacated the judgment and remanded for a determination of whether McPherson 
knew in fact that trial could go on without him. 421 F.2d at 1130-31. 
The dissent argued that the issue was not whether McPherson knew that trial 
could proceed in his absence, but whether he knew he had a right to be present and 
waived it. In United States v. Taylor (Taylor I), 478 F.2d 689 (1st Cir.) (aff'd, 414 
U.S. 17 (1973)), also a case where the defendant absented himself mid-trial, the 
appellate court adopted the reasoning of the McPherson dissent. If a "defendant 
5Defendant argues that Anderson's reliance on McPherson requires that defendant 
be given notice, or warned, that sentencing will occur even if he does not appear. Br. 
Aplt. at 8. Anderson, however, merely relied on McPherson for the proposition that a 
"defendant must have notice of proceedings." Anderson, 929 P.2d at 1110. 
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knew or should have known that he had a right to be present, his voluntary 
absence . . . [is] a waiver of that known right." Id. at 691 (internal quotation marks 
omitted). No warning that sentencing will continue in a defendant's absence is 
necessary because "[t]he very statement that a trial will continue or commence at a 
fixed time, when coupled with knowledge of one's right to be present at trial, 
implies that the continuation of the trial, at least in non-capital cases, does not 
depend on his presence." Id. 
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari in Taylor and affirmed. 
The Supreme Court, like First Circuit Court of Appeals, rejected Taylor's argument 
that "his mere voluntary absence from his trial [could not] be construed as an 
effective waiver . . . unless it is demonstrated that he knew or had been expressly 
warned by the trial court not only that he had a right to be present but also that the 
trial would continue in his absence." Taylor II, 414 U.S. at 19. Like the court 
below, the Supreme Court found that the issue was "the right to be present" and that 
"that right was effectively waived by [the defendant's] voluntary absence." Id. at 
20. The Court determined that no warning was required and reiterated that "a trial 
may not be defeated by conduct of the accused that prevents the trial from going 
forward." Id. The Supreme Court's opinion follows the reasoning of Taylor I and 
rejects the analysis of the McPherson majority. Defendant's reliance on McPherson 
is therefore unavailing. 
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Defendant also relies on Crosby v. United States, 506 U.S. 255 (1993), a more 
recent United States Supreme Court case that interprets Rule 43 of the Federal 
Rules of Criminal Procedure. In Crosby, the Court held that Rule 43, a more 
restrictive rule than its Utah counterpart, proscribes the commencement of a trial in 
a defendant's absence. The Court noted that Rule 43 permits the continuance, but 
not the commencement, of a trial in a defendant's absence. The case was decided 
on the basis of statute and did not reach any constitutional claim. The case did not 
address a warning requirement and does not support defendant's argument that 
warning is required. 
Crosby and Taylor are both consistent with the current version of Rule 43 of 
the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. While the rule requires a defendant's 
presence at the commencement of trial, the right to presence may be waived by 
absence during the continuation of trial and at sentencing: 
The further progress of the trial to and including the return of the 
verdict, and the imposition of sentence, will not be prevented and the 
defendant will be considered to have waived the right to be present 
whenever a defendant, initially present at trial, or having pleaded guilty 
or nolo contendere, 
(1) is voluntarily absent after the trial has commenced (whether or 
not the defendant has been informed by the court of the obligation to 
remain during trial), 
(2) in a noncapital case, is voluntarily absent at the imposition of 
sentence, or 
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(3) after being warned by the court that disruptive conduct will 
cause the removal of the defendant from the courtroom, persists in 
conduct which is such as to justify exclusion from the courtroom. 
Fed. R. Crim. P. 43(b). 
The federal rule therefore permits sentencing in absentia where a defendant 
has pleaded guilty and then voluntarily absents himself from sentencing. While the 
rule requires a warning to disruptive defendants, it requires no warning that 
sentencing will proceed if the defendant voluntarily absents himself. The advisory 
committee notes explain that the rationale behind the rule. "Delay in conducting the 
sentencing hearing [when a defendant voluntarily flees before sentence is imposed] 
may result in difficulty later in gathering and presenting the evidence necessary to 
formulate a guideline sentence."6 See Fed. R. Crim. P. 43 advisory committee's 
notes (1995 amendment). The rationale also supports Utah law permitting 
sentencing in absentia where a defendant voluntarily absents himself—the law set 
forth in Anderson and Rules 17 and 22 of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure. 
6Rule 43, as currently codified, permits sentencing, but not commencement of a 
trial, in a defendant's absence. The rule undermines defendant's argument that presence 
is more important at sentencing than at trial. See Br. Aplt. at 10. The federal cases cited 
by defendant in support of this argument interpreted a former version of Rule 43. 
Compare United States v. Lastra, 973 F.2d 952, 955 (D.C. Cir. 1992), and United States 
v. Turner, 532 F. Supp. 913, 915-16 (N.D. Ca. 1982) (both cited by defendant) with 
United States v. Jordan, 216 F.3d 1248, 1249-50 (11th Cir. 2000) and United States v. 
DiPrima, 165 F.R.D. 61 (E.D. Va. 1996) (both interpreting Rule 43 as amended in 1995). 
Their holdings are inconsistent with the current version of the rule, and their statements of 
policy support a position that was rejected when the rule was amended. 
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In sum, Utah law permits the trial court to sentence in absentia a defendant 
who is voluntarily absent from sentencing. Where a defendant has notice of the 
proceeding, is not incarcerated, and is therefore free to attend, but does not, the 
court may proceed to sentencing. Defendant, by his voluntary absence, waives his 
right to be present. Defendant need not be warned that sentencing will proceed in 
his absence. The governmental prerogative to proceed with a trial, including 
sentencing, "may not be defeated by conduct of the accused that prevents the trial 
from going forward." Taylor II, 414 U.S. at 20. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant's conviction should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on April / I , 2001. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General/^ I 
'JEANNE B. INOUYE 
distant Attorney General 
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ADDENDUM 
THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH vs. JON DONALD HAMLING 
CASE NUMBER 001909844 State Felony 
CHARGES 
Charge 1 - 58-37-8(2AI) - ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF 
CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE (amended) 
Attributes: Drug Schedule 2. 
Class A Misdemeanor Plea: June 15, 2000 Guilty 
Disposition: June 15, 2000 {Guilty Plea} 
Charge 2 - 58-37-8(2AI) - ILLEGAL POSS/USE OF CONTROLLED 
SUBSTANCE 
Class B Misdemeanor 
Disposition: June 15, 2000 Dismissed 
CURRENT ASSIGNED JUDGE 
J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
PARTIES 
Defendant - JON DONALD HAMLING 
Represented by: NISA J SISNEROS 
Plaintiff- STATE OF UTAH 
DEFENDANT INFORMATION 
Defendant Name: JON DONALD HAMLING 
Offense tracking number: 10951374 
Date of Birth: January 06, 1962 
Jail Booking Number: 10951374 
Law Enforcement Agency: COUNTY SHERIFF 
LEA Case Number: 00-63155 
Prosecuting Agency: SALT LAKE COUNTY 
Agency Case Number: DAO 00010444 
Sheriff Office Number: 113642 
Violation Date: May 19, 2000 1457 W ATHERTON DR 
ACCOUNT SUMMARY 
TRUST TOTALS Trust Due: 200.00 
Amount Paid: 0.00 
Credit: 0.00 
Trust Balance Due: 200.00 
Balance Payable: 0.00 
TRUST DETAIL 
Printed: 04/04/0115:11:57 Page 1 
CASE NUMBER 001909844 State Felony 
Trust Description: Attorney Fees 
Recipient: LDA 
Amount Due: 200.00 
Paid In: 0.00 
Paid Out: 0.00 
CASE NOTE 
*failed to appear for snt 8/4/00, sentenced in absentia* 
PROCEEDINGS 
06-07-00 Case filed by ryans ryans 
06-07-00 Note: CASE FILED BY DET BAILESS, SLCO SHERIFF'S OFFICE. DEF IN 
JAIL, WARRANT FAXED. ryans 
06-08-00 INITIAL APPEARANCE scheduled on June 09, 2000 at 09:30 AM in 
Arraignment Jail with Judge ARRAIGNMENT. caroleo 
06-08-00 Judge ARRAIGNMENT assigned caroleo 






Tape Number: 270 Tape Count: 394 
INITIAL APPEARANCE 
The Information is read. 
Defendant is arraigned. 
APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL 
Court finds the defendant indigent and appoints Legal Defender 
Office to represent the defendant. 
Appointed Counsel: 
Name: Legal Defender Office 
City: 
Phone: 
ROLL CALL is scheduled. 
Date: 06/15/2000 
Time: 09:00 a.m. 
Location: To Be Determined 
Third District Court 
450 South State 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Printed: 04/04/01 15:12:00 Page 2 
CASE NUMBER 001909844 State Felony 
Before Judge: ANTHONY B. QUINN 
06-09-00 ROLL CALL scheduled on June 15, 2000 at 09:00 AM in To Be 
Determined with Judge QUINN. barbarrs 
06-09-00 Note: Bail remain $5,000.00 connieg 
06-09-00 Filed: Affidavit of Indigency - Judge Boyden denied appointment 
of LDA connieg 
06-13-00 Filed: APPEARANCE OF COUNSEL amberh 
06-13-00 Filed: FORMAL REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY PURSUANT TO RULE 16 OF THE 
RULES OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE. amberh 
06-15-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for Change of Plea jillenew 
Judge: ANTHONY B. QUINN 
PRESENT 
Clerk: jillenew 
Prosecutor: MORGAN, B. KENT 
Defendant 
Defendant's Attomey(s): SISNEROS, NISA J 
Audio 
Tape Number: 253 Tape Count: 245 
Court advises defendant of rights and penalties. 
A pre-sentence investigation was ordered. 
The Judge orders Adult Probation & Parole to prepare a Pre-sentence report. 
Change of Plea Note 
Deft signed waiver of rights. 
Deft to be released to PTS will all conditions. 
CASE BOUNDOVER 
Defendant waived preliminary hearing, State consenting thereto. 
This case is bound over. A Sentencing has been set on 8/4/00 at 
08:30 AM in courtroomN41 before Judge J. DENNIS FREDERICK. 
06-15-00 Judge FREDERICK assigned jillenew 
06-15-00 SENTENCING scheduled on August 04, 2000 at 08:30 AM in Fourth 
Floor - N41 with Judge FREDERICK. jillenew 
06-15-00 Note: Case Bound Over jillenew 
06-20-00 Filed: Supervised Release Agreement marleneb 
08-04-00 Minute Entry - Minutes for SENTENCE, JUDGMENT, COMMITME cindyb 
Judge: J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
PRESENT 
Clerk: cindyb 
Prosecutor: BOWN, GREGORY L. 
Defendant not present 
Defendant's Attorney(s): SISNEROS, NISA J 
Video 
Tape Number: 1 Tape Count: 9:43-9:47 
Printed: 04/04/01 15:12:10 Page 3 
CASE NUMBER 001909844 State Felony 
SENTENCE JAIL 
Based on the defendant's conviction of ATTEMPTED ILLEGAL POSS/USE 
OF CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE a Class A Misdemeanor, the defendant is 
sentenced to a term of 1 year(s) 
Commitment is to begin immediately. 
Credit is granted for 28 day(s) previously served 
SENTENCE TRUST 
The defendant is to pay the following: 
Attorney Fees: Amount: $200.00 Plus Interest 
Pay in behalf of: LDA 
The Court finds the defendant has voluntarily absented himself from 
the sentencing proceedings. The Court orders defendant be committed 
forthwith upon his arrest on this Court's warrant. Counsel for the State to prepare the findings of fact 
and conclusions of law and order re absentia. 
08-07-00 Note: Party 3923459 DEF 
Custody changed from Pre-Trial Services 
Location changed from NONE cindyb 
08-07-00 Trust Account created Total Due: 200.00 cindyb 
08-07-00 Notice - WARRANT for Case 001909844 ED 655411 cindyb 
08-07-00 Warrant ordered on: August 07, 2000 Warrant Num 972120104 No 
Bail cindyb 
08-07-00 Warrant issued on: August 07, 2000 Warrant Num: 972120104 No 
Bail cindyb 
Judge: J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Issue reason: Failure to Appear. 
08-09-00 Judgment #1 Entered theresab 
08-09-00 Filed judgment: Criminal Sentence, Judgment, Commitment @J theresab 
Judge jfrederi 
Signed August 04, 2000 
08-09-00 Filed order: Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order (re 
absentia) cindyb 
Judge jfrederi 
Signed August 09, 2000 
08-10-00 Filed: Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence rhondam 
08-16-00 Filed: Response to Defendants Motion to Correct Illegal 
Sentence rhondam 
08-30-00 Filed order: M/E Ruling - Deft's Motion to Correct Illegal 
Sentence is denied for the reasons specified in the opposing 
memorandum. cindyb 
Judge jfrederi 
Signed August 30, 2000 
08-31 -00 Filed: Notice of Appeal rhondam 
Printed: 04/04/01 15:12:10 Page 4 
CASE NUMBER 001909844 State Felony 
08-31 -00 Filed: Designation of Record rhondam 
08-31 -00 Filed: Certificate rhondam 
08-31-00 Filed: Request for Transcript rhondam 
09-19-00 Filed: Notice of Filing of Transcript (Plea hearing 6/15/00 and 
Sentencing 08/04/00) kathys 
09-19-00 Filed: Reporter's Transcript - Plea Hearing on 06/15/00 kathys 
09-19-00 Filed: Reporter's Transcript - Sentencing 08/04/00 kathys 
09-20-00 Note: Cert, copies forwarded to Court of Appeals: Notice of 
Appeal, Designation of Record, Certificate, Request for 
Transcript, Transcript Request/Billing Statement kathys 
09-22-00 Filed: Court of Appeals letter to Nisa J. Sisneros (COA # 
20000813-CA) - Notice of Appeal filed with Court of Appeals kathys 
10-11-00 Note: *Faxed copy of "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment" to Salt 
Lake County Jail and Utah County Jail. Clerk was advised the 
defendant is in Utah County Jail.* cindyb 
10-17-00 Warrant recalled on: October 17, 2000 Warrant num 972120104 kimbers 
Recall reason: Warrant recalled because defendant was 
booked. 
10-17-00 Note: File referred to Judge Frederick's clerk, deft in jail mirandab 
10-17-00 Filed: Motion to Appeal Sentence (treated as a Notice of 
Appeal) sophieo 
10-17-00 Note: Index/Record: (File-1, Trans-2) taken up to Court of 
Appeals - Coa#20000813-ca sophieo 
10-17-00 Note: *Faxed copy of "Sentence, Judgment, Commitment" to the 
Salt Lake County Jail (ADC). Defendant was booked on 10/16/00. *cindyb 
11 -27-00 Filed: Affidavit of Impecuniosity rhondam 
Printed: 04/04/01 15:12:10 Page 5 (last) 
